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We study a practical method to measure the shot noise in real time in Continuous Variable
Quantum Key Distribution (CVQKD) systems. The amount of secret key that can be extracted
from the raw statistics depends strongly on this quantity since it affects in particular the computation
of the excess noise (i.e. noise in excess of the shot noise) added by an eavesdropper on the quantum
channel. Some powerful quantum hacking attacks relying on faking the estimated value of the shot
noise to hide an intercept and resend strategy [1] were proposed [2]. Here, we provide experimental
evidence that our method can defeat the saturation attack [3] and the wavelength attack [4].
I. INTRODUCTION
QKD [5] is a quantum information technology prim-
itive which allows two distant parties, Alice and Bob,
to establish a secret key out of communications through
an untrusted physical channel and a public authenti-
cated channel. Its advantage over classical cryptographic
primitives is that the produced keys are secure in the
information-theoretic sense even against an eavesdrop-
per limited only by the laws of quantum mechanics,
i.e. in particular with unlimited computational resources
and/or advanced knowledge of classical cryptanalysis
techniques.
The first QKD realizations used unique photons to
carry information. In their case, the impossibility to
clone photons perfectly is the source of the security. Al-
though the requirement to send unique photons was re-
laxed, their measurement still requires specialized detec-
tors, usually cooled much below 0 degree Celsius. In
contrast to this technology usually named Discrete Vari-
able (DV) QKD, Continuous Variable QKD or CVQKD
has been the subject of great interest in the past few
years [6] because it can be implemented with only stan-
dard components optimized for the telecommunications
industry and features nice characteristics such as a coher-
ent detector which acts as a natural filter against clas-
sical Raman noise [7] which is the main source of noise
in WDM infrastructures where QKD signals coexist with
intense signals at other wavelengths. Thanks to the pos-
sibility to encode more than one bit per pulse, it was
shown recently that its secret key rate is expected to
be competitive with DVQKD techniques assuming some
reasonable clock rate improvements [8]. The practical se-
cure distance of CVQKD is 80 km [9] taking into account
finite-size effects and several other imperfections [10]. It
is currently limited by the technical noise of the system
which is attributed to a potential eavesdropper.
Quantum hacking against commercial DVQKD sys-
tems has been demonstrated in the past few years
through powerful attacks, namely the time-shift attack
[11], the phase-remapping attack [12], and the remote
control of single-photon detectors using tailored bright il-
lumination [13]. Other attacks proposed against discrete-
variable QKD systems include Trojan horse [14], device
calibration [15], and wavelength dependent beamsplitter
[16] attacks. The latter has been adapted to CVQKD [4]
while saturation attacks [3] are CVQKD-specific. Gen-
erally, hacking of practical devices is a central topic in
QKD since this is where the high theoretical security ex-
pectations of QKD meet reality.
For any QKD system, some statistics about the trans-
mitted data are used to evaluate the amount of infor-
mation that may be in possession of an attacker. For
DVQKD protocols, the transmitted data are usually bi-
nary strings, and the eavesdropper information estimate
only depends on the bit error rate between Alice’s and
Bob’s data, and is zero for a null bit error-rate. For
coherent-state CVQKD, the picture is more complex: the
received data is always noisy because of a quantum noise
term, the shot noise. The estimate of the eavesdropper
information depends on the excess noise which is the dif-
ference between the observed noise and the shot noise,
and also on the observed correlation between the emitter
and the receiver. The excess noise is typically at least
one order of magnitude smaller than the shot noise.
One of the main implementation difficulties of CVQKD
is to measure the shot noise with the required precision
[9] to be able to compute the excess noise on the signal.
The historical method to estimate the shot noise is to
calibrate once-and-for-all the slope of the local oscillator
to shot noise linear relation on the homodyne detection,
and then to measure in real time the power of the lo-
cal oscillator. It was shown in [2] that this relationship is
prone to changes over time, especially under the influence
of an attacker. In the case of a polarization dependent
scheme, as the one pictured in Fig. 1, the shot noise
is usually measured at the entrance of Bob before po-
larizations are separated; in this setting, this shot noise
estimation technique is prone to shot noise overestima-
tion when a polarization drift causes the optical power
on the detection to be smaller than expected.
Because of the shortcomings of this shot noise mea-
surement technique, another technique was proposed in
[2]. It attempts to separate the shot noise and the sig-
nal noise contributions in the total measured noise on
signal by adding an active attenuation device on Bob’s
signal path, and measuring the total noise for two val-
ues of the attenuation ratio, exploiting the experimental
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2observation that the contribution of the signal noise is
proportional to the signal itself, hence should be propor-
tional to the attenuation factor imposed to the signal.
Unfortunately, a theoretical attack scenario against
this procedure was proposed in [4]. It works by exploit-
ing defects in typical beam splitters to introduce specially
crafted signals in both the signal path and the local oscil-
lator path on Bob’s side, which causes the attenuation-to-
noise relation to become non-affine. The computations to
evaluate the contributions of the shot noise and the ex-
cess noise in the total noise then yield wrong results, and
with correct attack parameters this produces an under-
estimated excess noise and an overestimated key rate. It
was remarked in [4] that using not two, but three atten-
uation ratios was sufficient to thwart this attack.
In this paper we present a more general shot noise /
excess noise measurement technique using an active at-
tenuation device on Bob’s side, and show how it thwarts
several known attacks on CVQKD systems. This pro-
posal is based on an earlier idea suggested in a patent
made by SeQureNet [17], and in [2]. More importantly,
we show that experimental data extracted from a real
CVQKD setup are compatible with this countermeasure,
i.e. real data are not incorrectly flagged as being caused
by an attacker. As we explain in more details in this pa-
per, our strategy allows to detect attacks that modify the
linear relation between the variance of the signal and the
variance on the noise, which is observed in the laboratory
when no attacker is present. Some attacks do not mod-
ify this relation if they are correctly implemented, like
Trojan horse attacks [14] for example. However, some
passive countermeasures like the use of optical fuses or
optical isolators can be used to defeat such attacks.
In Section II, we present our optical setup and detail
how we obtain our measurement results. We devote Sec-
tion III to practical excess noise measurements and study
three cases: Section IIIA gives experimental results in
the absence of an attacker while Section III B and Sec-
tion III C respectively include simulations of the behavior
of the countermeasure when faced with the wavelength
attack [4] and the saturation attack [3].
II. OPTICAL SETUP, MEASUREMENTS
Figure 1 presents our implementation of the Gaussian
coherent-state homodyne CVQKD protocol[18]. Alice
modulates a Gaussian mixture of coherent states with
a phase and an amplitude modulator. Coherent light
pulses with a duration of 100 ns and a repetition rate of
1 MHz are generated by a 1550 nm laser diode and split
into a weak signal and a strong local oscillator (called the
Local Oscillator or LO for short), which provides the re-
quired phase reference. Both the strong phase reference
signal and the weak information-carrying signal are sent
to Bob, thanks to a polarization and time multiplexing
scheme: the signal pulse is 200 ns delayed with respect to
the LO pulse using a 20 m delay line and a Faraday mirror
while both pulses are multiplexed with orthogonal polar-
ization using a polarizing beamsplitter (PBS). On Bob’s
side, the polarization drift that occurs on the quantum
channel is actively compensated, then the LO and the
signal are demultiplexed on Bob’s side with another PBS
combined with active polarization control (the mean and
variance of the measurements on the homodyne detection
are used as feedback signals to compensate for slow polar-
ization drifts using a Dynamic Polarization Controller).
A second delay line on Bob’s side allows for time super-
position of signal and LO pulses. A phase modulator on
the LO path enables to select the quadrature of the signal
that is measured on the homodyne detection through the
interference of the phase-modulated LO and the signal.
An amplitude modulator is added on the signal path to
simulate various signal attenuation ratios. For each at-
tenuation ratio and for large enough groups of N pulses,
the measured signal Y is projected as a N -dimensional
vector on the signal X emitted by Alice. Thus Y is writ-
ten S + (Y − S) where S is the signal proportional to X
and Y − S is the noise orthogonal to X. In particular,
when the signal path attenuation ratio is set to 0, the
signal is 0 up to statistical noise and, assuming there is
no manipulation of the LO, the shot noise is measured
on the homodyne detection. Independently of the atten-
uation level, the noise Y − S is equal to the sum of the
shot noise and the excess noise. The current let through
by the homodyne detection photodiodes is amplified by
a transimpedance amplifier and the raw measurement re-
sults are therefore expressed in volts.
Assuming the homodyne detection has a linear signal
response, the relationship of the excess noise variance to
the signal variance, as well as the relationship between
the signal variance and the attenuation ratio imposed on
the signal path, should be linear. Indeed, any noise added
to the signal will scale with the signal. A failure of one of
these two tests gives a strong indication of the presence
of an attacker as we shall see in the next sections.
Of course, to prevent any adaptive behavior of an at-
tacker that would act differently depending on the atten-
uation ratio applied by Bob, it is required to choose ran-
domly the attenuation ratio applied to individual pulses.
Furthermore the modulation of Alice must be indepen-
dent of these attenuation choices. In our setup, these
choices are made by Bob. Since secret key is produced
only from the least attenuated groups, some information
about the attenuation ratio selection is transmitted to
Alice by Bob after the signal pulses are received. In the
usual model where Alice’s and Bob’s laboratories are as-
sumed to be out of reach of any attacker, this is suffi-
cient to prevent any adaptive behavior of the attacker.
Trojan horse attacks [14] are examples of attacks where
Eve might acquire knowledge of Alice’s and/or Bob’s
measurement and attenuation choices but these attacks,
which break the usual assumption that Alice and Bob’s
device are out of reach of the attacker, are not considered
in the present paper.
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Figure 1: Optical scheme of a GG02 [18] implementation using time and polarization multiplexing, and including an amplitude
modulator on the signal path of the receiver. Coherent light pulses with a duration of 100 ns and a repetition rate of 1 MHz are
generated by a 1550 nm laser diode and split into a weak signal and a strong local oscillator (called the Local Oscillator or LO for
short), which provides the required phase reference. Both the strong phase reference signal and the weak information-carrying
signal are sent to Bob, thanks to a polarization and time multiplexing scheme: the signal pulse is 200 ns delayed with respect
to the LO pulse using a 20 m delay line and a Faraday mirror while both pulses are multiplexed with orthogonal polarization
using a polarizing beamsplitter (PBS). On Bob’s side, the polarization drift that occurs on the quantum channel is actively
compensated, then the LO and the signal are demultiplexed on Bob’s side with another PBS combined with active polarization
control. A second delay line on Bob’s side allows for time superposition of signal and LO pulses. A phase modulator on the
LO path enables to select the quadrature of the signal that is measured on the homodyne detection through the interference
of the phase-modulated LO and the signal. An amplitude modulator is added on the signal path to simulate various signal
attenuation ratios.
III. SLOPE MEASUREMENTS: PRACTICAL
RESULTS
A. Experimental Results Without an Attacker
We first show the noise-to-signal and signal-to-
attenuation relationships on a practical experimental
setup. On Bob’s side, 16 different attenuation settings
are used with ratios ri satisfying ri/ri+1 ≈ 0.7. This
ratio is chosen so that r0/r15 is approximately equal to
the amplitude modulator extinction ratio (here about 25
dB) in order to exploit its attenuation range. Data are
gathered according to their attenuation setting and to
the quadrature measurement performed (X or P ). The
noise and signal variance in each group are computed
on approximately N = 5 × 108 points. The resulting
signal-to-noise relationships are shown on Fig. 2 and
Fig. 3. Let si be the signal variances and ni be the
corresponding noise variances. The squared correlation
coefficient R2 = Cov
2(s,n)
Var(s) Var(n) which measures the quality
of the affine correspondence between s and n is 0.9974 for
quadrature X and 0.9979 for quadrature P. In shot noise
units (i.e. divided by the constant term of the affine in-
terpolation), the absolute values of errors w.r.t the linear
model never exceed 1.3.10−4. This shows that a simple
affine model for the noise-to-signal relationship can be
observed in practice with good precision. The estima-
tions of the shot noise derived by linear regression on
both quadratures, despite being obtained from two dif-
ferent datasets, also agree with very good precision: on
quadrature X, the estimate is 783.16 mV2, while on P
it is estimated to 783.19 mV2, meaning that the relative
error is about 3.5 10−5. This error is consistent with our
dataset size since it corresponds to approximately 0.55
standard deviations of the variance estimator of N nor-
malized Gaussian values. The slope of both curves, equal
respectively to 2.07 × 10−3 and 2.12 × 10−3, show that
the excess noises observed on Bob side for small SNRs
(e.g. 0.1) are compatible with key production up to 100
km approximately.
Figure 4 shows the variation of the signal variance as a
function of the attenuation applied by Bob, on the same
dataset. Again we have a very good linearity (R2 =
0.9996). Only the X quadrature is represented, since X
and P curves are visually indistinguishable. Indeed, the
small error term is not random but rather caused by a
systematic error in the control of the attenuation ratio,
and is very similar on X and P datasets.
One can ask why there is such a strong linear relation-
ship between the excess noise variance and the attenua-
tion applied by Bob when there is no attacker. Such a
noise is for instance produced by an imperfect modula-
tion, modeled by a noise term Z added to the expected
output of Alice S. This noise term is attenuated by Bob’s
active attenuation device exactly like the signal itself, and
will contribute to the slope of the line in Fig. 2 and Fig.
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Figure 2: Noise variance as a function of signal variance
in arbitrary units, X quadrature. The noise and signal vari-
ance are computed on approximately N = 5 × 108 points in
each group. The squared correlation coefficient R2 is 0.9974
for quadrature X. The slope is equal to 2.07 × 10−3. Error
bars corresponding to 3 standard deviations of the statistical
estimators are shown for the noise only, since for the signal
variance they would be too thin to see.
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Figure 3: Noise variance as a function of signal variance in
arbitrary units, P quadrature. The noise and signal variance
are computed on approximately N = 5 × 108 points in each
group. The squared correlation coefficient R2 is 0.9979 for
quadrature P. The slope is equal to 2.12× 10−3. Errors bars
are shown as in Fig. 2.
3. Conversely, a non-linearity of the homodyne detection
would produce a noise term that is not proportional to
the attenuation level. Our experiments therefore suggest
that the main contribution to the technical noise of our
system is caused by the imperfect modulation of Alice.
From these experimental results we derive the criteria
that are applied to incoming data that govern whether
data blocks are used to produce some secret key: When
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Figure 4: Signal variance as a function of the theoretical
attenuation ratio applied by Bob, X quadrature. The signal
variance is computed on approximately N = 5 × 108 points
in each group. The correlation coefficient R2 is 0.9996 for
quadrature X.
16 × N data have been acquired at various attenuation
levels, the least attenuated block is used for key produc-
tion if the squared correlation factor R2 for the linear fit
of the noise-to-signal curve is above 0.99 and the maxi-
mum error term in shot noise units (difference between
the fitted line and the observed curve) does not exceed
2.10−4. Additionally the squared correlation factor of
the attenuation-to-signal-variance relationship must be
above 0.99. When some data is accepted, the excess noise
and the shot noise used for the key rate estimation are
computed with the help of the linear regression on the
signal-to-noise curve. If secret key is produced only from
the least attenuated group, 94% of the pulses are used
for parameter estimation. This can be overcome by us-
ing other blocks for key production, or by increasing the
size of the least attenuated block.
B. Simulation with Wavelength Attack
In the wavelength attack [4], the optical setup and the
imperfections of beam splitters are exploited to add to
the measured values a deterministic signal whose am-
plitude depends on Bob’s signal attenuation ratio as a
degree-2 polynomial. The parameters of the attack can
be chosen so that this polynomial has its minimum when
the attenuation ratio is equal to 1. When the attenuation
ratio is 0, a positive term is added to the shot noise vari-
ance and the sum of these two quantities is mistakenly
used as the shot noise estimate, causing the excess noise
to be improperly normalized. When combined with a full
intercept-and-resend attack that is performed at the out-
put of Alice, the noise added by the intercept-and-resend
can be partially masked by the wavelength attack. An
example of this scenario is summarized on Fig. 5.
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Figure 5: Noise/Signal curve with and without wavelength
attack. The non-normalized green curve shows the net effect
of the attack on the detector: the added term is largest when
the signal is 0, i.e. when the attenuation ratio is 0. After
rescaling, the added term results in a lower estimate of the
excess noise (red curve). Here VA = 20 and T = 1.
The signal-to-attenuation relationship is unaffected by
this attack, hence its linearity cannot be used to detect
the presence of the attacker.
In the case of a full intercept and resend, the signal
that must be added to cancel the excess noise induces
a rather strong nonlinearity which results in a squared
correlation factor of 0.94, and is therefore easily detected.
In a more general scenario, the attack can be used to
tamper slightly with the excess noise evaluation of the
receiver. For a difference to linearity of 2 . 10−4 shot noise
units as we observe normally in our setup, it is possible to
use the wavelength attack to hide approximately 1 . 10−3
units of excess noise on the receiver side for each unit
of signal. This slope is below the technical noise of our
system which is about 2 . 10−3 units of excess noise for
each unit of signal as seen on Fig. 2 and Fig. 3. Therefore
adopting the data acceptance criteria laid out at the end
of section IIIA, the measured slope of the noise-to-signal
relationship can be trusted up to 1 . 10−3 units of noise
per unit of signal variance.
With this conservative parameter estimation proce-
dure, the results of [9], which showed a positive key rate
at 80.5Km with a SNR of 0.075, remain valid, even tak-
ing into account the reduced efficiency η ≈ 0.3 of Bob’s
detection device caused by the addition of an amplitude
modulator on the signal path. This is in contrast to Fig.
5 of [2], which uses a higher noise figure as the one given
by our new measurements. More precisely, a noise slope
of 2 . 10−3 +1 . 10−3, where the first term corresponds to
the technical noise of our system and the second term
is the margin of error possibly caused by the wavelength
attack, leads to an estimated excess noise on Bob’s side
of 0.08 × 3.10−3 = 2.4 . 10−4 shot noise units. This cor-
responds at 80.5 Km to an excess noise on Alice’s side
of 2.4 . 10−4 . 100.02 . 80.5/0.322 = 3%. Alice’s modulation
variance needed to have a SNR of 0.075 on Bob side is
equal to 9.5 units of shot noise. Reusing other parameters
of [2], namely η = 0.322, an electronic noise of 1% of the
shot noise and a reconciliation efficiency of 94.8%, one
gets a collective secret key rate of approximately 10−3
bits per symbol.
C. Simulation With Saturation Attack
As the wavelength attack, the saturation attack [3] is
aimed at hiding a full or partial intercept and resend by
tampering with the excess noise measurement of the re-
ceiver. It assumes that the homodyne detection, when
measuring a quadrature x of some state, outputs not x
but Min(Max(x,−α), α) for some α > 0. Indeed, only a
finite range of quadrature values can be adequately mea-
sured, either because of limitations of the analog elec-
tronics of the detection, or because of the range of the
analog-to-digital conversion. To exploit this, the states
received by Bob are shifted by an offset which causes the
detection to be near the saturation point. When the off-
set is increased, both the signal and the noise variance
tend to 0; indeed, for a sufficiently large value of the
offset, the detection is stuck to its saturation level with
overwhelming probability. If one uses an attenuation de-
vice on the signal path to shut off the signal and measure
the shot noise, this measure is unaltered because the sat-
urated signal is blocked when the shot noise is measured.
As a result, a simple excess noise measurement where
only the difference between the signal noise and the shot
noise is computed may be defeated by this attack. How-
ever, simulations show that a more complete look at the
signal and noise for several signal attenuations ratios eas-
ily reveals the saturation phenomenon.
All simulations are done with a value of α equal to 4
times the shot noise standard deviation, so that the shot
noise variance measurement is not significantly affected
by the saturation limit of the detection. The offset im-
posed by the attacker is also equal to 4 times the shot
noise standard deviation. A full intercept and resend at-
tack is assumed, so that the excess noise is 2 units of shot
noise for an unattenuated signal [1].
For a high variance on the receiver side, we obtain fig-
ure 6. In this case the obtained curve is clearly not a line
(the squared correlation coefficient is 0.386). Further-
more the apparent noise-vs-signal slope is higher than in
the non-saturated case: in this regime, the attack does
not improve the perceived excess noise slope.
On the contrary, for low variance on the receiver side
such as the results shown in Fig. 7 (here a signal variance
of 1 unit of shot noise), the noise variance falls before the
signal variance falls too, and the resulting curve is below
the normal unsaturated line, hence a direct comparison
of the points with attenuation ratios of 0 and 1 would
yield an excess noise slope lower than the real, unsatu-
rated value. However the full curve observed is again very
far from being a line (the squared correlation coefficient
is now 0.665), which enables us to reject the acquired
data without even considering the signal-to-attenuation
response curve.
The limit case is represented by Fig. 8. In that
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Figure 6: Noise/Signal curve similar to experimental curves
of Fig. 2 and Fig. 3, with and without saturation, for a
modulation variance on the receiver side VB = 20.
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Figure 7: Noise/Signal curve with and without saturation, for
a line transmission of 1 and a modulation variance VB = 1.
case, the noise and signal variance values, despite being
severely distorted compared to the unsaturated case, still
lie on the unsaturated line: the squared correlation coef-
ficient is 0.998, with a slope very close to the unsaturated
line (0.39 vs 0.40). Thus a direct look at this relationship
may not be sufficient to reject the data. However, the
signal-to-attenuation plot is clearly abnormal as shown
on Fig. 9: when the attenuation ratio is close enough to
1, the signal variance falls instead of increasing.
Even without resorting to the signal-to-attenuation lin-
earity check, it can be noted that the attack fails to lower
significantly the excess noise slope, and therefore fails to
hide the intercept-and-resend added noise in that case.
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Figure 8: Noise/Signal curve with and without saturation, for
a line transmission of 1 and a modulation variance VB = 5.
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Figure 9: Signal as a function of Bob’s attenuation ratio with
and without saturation, for a line transmission of 1 and a
modulation variance VB = 5.
One area not explored in these graphs is the varia-
tion of the offset used by the attacker to cause the de-
tection saturation. Its effect is to scale the saturated
noise-to-signal curve: with a higher offset, the saturation
effects appear for a smaller attenuation ratio. It does not
change the general shape of the curve and in particular
the squared correlation factor of the linear fit can only be
improved by reducing the offset to reduce the overall sat-
uration effect. We encourage attackers to experimentally
test these theoretical dependencies and explore in details
the behaviour of the homodyne detection as it has been
done with single photon detectors [13].
IV. CONCLUSION
We proposed some specific criteria to decide whether
data should be accepted for post-processing in an imple-
mentation of Gaussian coherent CVQKD. These crite-
ria depend on the normal behavior of an optical system
implementing the protocol and define acceptable devia-
tions from the ideal apparatus. It was shown that such a
data filtering can defeat known attacks on coherent states
CVQKD, except in the limit where the magnitude of the
signature of the attack is comparable to the technical
noise of the system. The parameter estimation can be
modified in a conservative way to get around this limita-
tion. Checking the linearity of the signal-to-attenuation
response is an approximate way to test whether the ho-
modyne detection output is proportional to a quadrature
of the incoming electromagnetic field, which is an implicit
hypothesis in all CVQKD security proofs. Because of the
general nature of this test, we believe it applies to a wide
range of potential attacks aimed at biasing the parameter
estimation process and considerably improves the prac-
tical security of CVQKD.
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